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gdpcap~a |  -1.34e-07      .00001   -0.03   0.980  -.000011   .00001   11403.8 
fordep~a |   2.25e-07      .00000    1.06   0.289  -1.9e-07  6.4e-07    423892 
d0tdummy*|  -.4640011      .07904   -5.87   0.000  -.618913  -.30909   .592308 
commwe~h*|  -.1094256      .09404   -1.16   0.245   -.29375  .074899   .276923 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
 
 
It's quite evident that  the regression have not explanatory power. The only exception is 
represented  by the Terrorism and Organised Crime Index: We can say  that the  probability that a 
country became an Offshore centre tend to be higher : 
 
    * as the degree of terrorism and organised crime risks decrease (significance at 0%). 
 
In general, therefore, we can reject the hyphotesis that the causes of LFR decisions and 
of  Offshore activities are the same. 
 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The lax financial regulation problem, favouring the money laundering phenomena,  can 
increase world-wide the risks of terrorism and of organised crime. In this paper we have explored 
theoretically and empirically the issue. 
Theoretically, the degree of financial laxity can be an endogenous variable, determined 
by  the policy maker cost -benefits analysis, depending then on economic and institutional country 
variables, as the growth level, the role of the financial industry, the reputation sensibility, the 
absence of terrorism and/or of organised crime, the institutional attractiveness. 
Empirically, the empirical analysis does not repudiate the theoretical assumption that 
countries, that because of scant resources,   foreign dependence in the offering of financial services, 
and absence  of terrorism and/or organised crime risks,  and perhaps insensitivity to the 
international community judgement,  can derive  net expected national benefits from offering 
laundering services for illicit foreign capital, and therefore can be or become LFR countries.  
The empirical relationships developed are probably interesting but not definitive or 
conclusive. This prompts at least three reflections. In terms of results, we must stress that the 
potential LFR country display uniform economic and institutional elements, bolstering the 
significance of the FATF action, but also marked dissimilarities among them. This suggests two 
indications for designing international policies of prevention and combat. On the one hand, that by 
modifying their formal rules they do not automatically cease to be LFR countries, since the 
incentives for laxity in combating the laundering of illicit capital may be very deep-rooted. On the 
other hand, that the international community can have an impact on those roots through stick-and-
carrot policies tailored to each country, precisely because the degree of laxity and its motivations 
may not be identical in each case.  
On a battlefield where reputation is one of the main weapons, policy makers engaged in 
the fight against international money laundering schemes should be very cautious in taking 
initiatives that may affect the reputation of the actors involved.  A pure “name and shame” approach 
may even prove counterproductive.  Tampering with reputational mechanisms might, at the same 
time, not only miss the target but also reach the wrong target.  First, there is a high risk of false 
negatives, i.e. of including in a hypothetical list of countries that supply money laundering services 
countries that are merely engaged in the offer of financial services of superior quality.  The costs of 
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such an error appear great.  To put it with the Financial Stability Forum, “not all [Off-shore centres] 
are the same.  Some are well supervised and prepared to share information with other centres, and 
co-operate with international initiatives to improve supervisory practices. But the Survey carried out 
by the [Financial Stability Forum] indicated that there are serious concerns by onshore supervisors 
about the quality of supervision in, and degree of co-operation provided by, some [Off-shore 
centres].”60 
Reputation is the basic tool of the trade also for countries that are not involved in money 
laundering schemes but are merely aiming at attracting capitals from abroad thorough the offer of 
superior quality financial services.  From this perspective, a mistake by the international community 
that includes the wrong country in the list might cause serious distortions in the competition among 
jurisdictions.  These countries, like victims of friendly fire, will find their reputation in the financial 
community seriously hampered, to the detriment of their role in the market.  In the long run, such 
types of mistake appear also capable of curbing innovation in the financial sector.  Regulatory 
arbitrage is a powerful force in driving innovation, and the international community should 
recognise that tinkering with the reputation of the actors involved is a dangerous game. 
But even assuming that the international community is capable of effectively singling 
out LFR country that are indeed involved in money laundering schemes, a cautious approach is still 
deemed necessary.  When the international community points the finger at a given country as a 
leading supplier of money laundering financial services, it may also be certifying, to the benefit of 
the country itself, that that country is indeed specialised in that business.   
The signalling effect embedded in the “name and shame approach” should not be 
underestimated.  The main difficulty for a LFR country is solving credibly the commitment 
problem:  Then, what’s best for the LFR country than having the international community, not 
exactly its closest friends, solving that problem with a public statement?  Listing should also be 
regarded as a sort of third party bonding, which is likely to generate two intertwined effects.  First, 
it is capable of cementing the commitment by the LFR country.  Secondly, naming increases the 
transaction specific character of investments in reputation.  The inclusion in a list increases the 
value of the (sunk) investments in reputation.  A state that is engaged in money laundering and that 
finds itself blacklisted will find it even more difficult to switch course and decide to exit the market, 
thus being encouraged to compete aggressively in the market. The final result does not change 
much.  They still need to move forward. 
This is not to say that the international community should not endeavour in listing 
countries that are involved in the market for money laundering services.  Quite to the contrary; what 
this paper argues, is that a per se “name and shame” approach, separated from other initiatives, 
equals to a third party seal on the reputation of LFR countries.  Names should be named, but only if 
blacklisting goes hand in hand with other measures that are capable of outweighing the positive 
effects experienced by the off-shore centre as a result of the inclusion in the list.  
Appropriate countermeasures should be grounded on the premise that even the most 
efficient LFR country will still need, in a globalised world, to be integrated in world financial 
markets.  This implies that no matter how many layers of transactions cover the predicate offence, 
terrorism or criminal organisations will still need to place that money within the lawful financial 
sector.  This step is necessary, at a minimum, in order to exploit in lawful uses the capitals, once 
they have been laundered.  Money laundering is by definition instrumental to a later use. 
With this regard, it should be noted that there is a fundamental feature of the initiative 
taken by the FATF that appears to be pivotal for its success.  The FATF has not limited its initiative 
to a mere recognition of “non co-operative countries and territories.”  FATF member states have 
                                                                 
60  FINANCIAL STABILITY FORUM, (2000) Executive Summary, at 2. 
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also applied “Recommendation 21”61 to the countries included in the list.  “Recommendation 21” 
requires a higher scrutiny by financial intermediaries in evaluating the possible suspect nature of 
transactions with counterparts, including legal persons, based in a country listed as non-co-
operative.  As a result of the FATF initiative, many countries included in the list have already taken 
initiatives aimed at overcoming the serious deficiencies observed by the FATF.62   
These initiatives need to be evaluated in the medium to the long run, because, for 
example, some of the enacted laws will need secondary regulations to be put in place to become 
effective, or, more generally, the initiatives taken at the legislative level will need to be followed by 
concrete actions.  However, it can be argued that the threat of being crowded out by the 
international community has played a great role in spurring the adoption of the above mentioned 
initiatives. 
The second conclusion that can be reached on the basis of the empirical evidence we 
have examined, is that we must not exclude the possibility that there are LFR countries not 
presently included in the FATF monitoring action, perhaps because they are highly effective in 
bringing their formal rules in line with international precepts, while in their deeds they remain lax in 
the fight against money laundering. This implies a constant effort on the part of international 
organisations, particularly the FATF, in updating the criteria and monitoring the countries.  
                                                                 
61  See Fatf, (1990). (2000) 
62  See Fatf press communiqué of October 5th, 2000. 
